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SHOULD ROBOTS PROSECUTE AND DEFEND? 
STEPHEN E. HENDERSON 
 
Abstract 
Even when we achieve the ‘holy grail’ of artificial intelligence—machine 
intelligence that is at least as smart as a human being in every area of 
thought—there may be classes of decisions for which it is intrinsically 
important to retain a human in the loop. On the common account of 
American criminal adjudication, the role of prosecutor seems to include 
such decisions given the largely unreviewable declination authority, 
whereas the role of defense counsel would seem fully susceptible of 
automation. And even for the prosecutor, the benefits of automation might 
outweigh the intrinsic decision-making loss, given that the ultimate 
decision—by judge or jury—should remain a human (or at least role-
reversible) one. Thus, while many details need to be worked out, we might 
within decades have a criminal justice system consisting of robo-defense 
lawyers and robo-prosecutors. And even if we never do, their consideration 
provides another lens through which to consider these roles and, ultimately, 
our criminal justice system. 
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Introduction 
The more things change, the more they stay the same. 
In 1956, a group of scientists proposed a summer workshop at 
Dartmouth: 
We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial 
intelligence be carried out. . . . An attempt will be made to find 
how to make machines that use language, form abstractions and 
concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and 
improve themselves. We think that a significant advance can be 
made in one or more of these problems if a carefully selected 
group of scientists work on it together for a summer.1 
Well, if they work all summer, sure. 
Such (naive) hope naturally engendered (exaggerated) concern. In 1964, 
President Lyndon Johnson signed legislation creating the National 
Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, seeking 
to reassure a troubled nation that “[a]utomation is not our enemy.”2 The 
Introduction to the Commission’s Report, delivered in 1966, acknowledged 
that while “[t]he vast majority of people quite rightly have accepted 
technological change as beneficial,” there was also ample fear: 
Another concern [with technological progress] has been the 
apparently harmful influences of modern technology on the 
physical and community environment—leading to such 
                                                                                                                 
 1. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 6 (2014). 
 2. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing Bill Creating the National Commission 
on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 19, 
1964), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/241917. President Johnson continued: “Our 
enemies are ignorance, indifference, and inertia. Automation can be the ally of our 
prosperity if we will just look ahead, if we will understand what is to come, and if we will 
set our course wisely after proper planning for the future.” Id. 
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problems as air and water pollution, . . . deterioration of natural 
beauty, and the rapid depletion of natural resources. Another 
concern has been the apparently harmful influence of urban, 
industrial, and technical civilization upon the personality of 
individual human beings—leading to rootlessness, anonymity, 
insecurity, monotony, and mental disorder. Still another concern, 
perhaps the one most responsible for the establishment of the 
Commission, has arisen from the belief that technological 
change is a major source of unemployment. . . . The fear has 
even been expressed by some that technological change would in 
the near future not only cause increasing unemployment, but that 
eventually it would eliminate all but a few jobs, with the major 
portion of what we now call work being performed automatically 
by machine.3 
It is hardly surprising, then, that as artificial intelligence technologies 
continue to mature, humans continue to fret. And so we should. In his 
seminal book Superintelligence, Nick Bostrom quickly establishes that a 
machine ‘intelligence explosion’ could—as a matter of historical rates of 
production—be expected.4 That takes him four pages. He then spends some 
three hundred pages articulating countless scenarios of how it could go 
sufficiently wrong as to constitute an existential threat to humanity. 
Thus, it is natural, and expected, that many of us are wondering what the 
achievement of artificial general intelligence, or AGI—meaning broad-
scale, human-level machine intelligence—might mean for the practice of 
law.5 And not everyone is an optimist. 
Although they ultimately conclude that “algorithmic governance” can 
satisfy the requirements of governmental transparency, Cary Coglianese 
and David Lehr begin a recent paper with this rather startling claim: 
When Abraham Lincoln declared in 1863 that government “of 
the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish 
                                                                                                                 
 3. NATIONAL COMM’N ON TECH., AUTOMATION & ECON. PROGRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY xi–xii (1966), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED023803.pdf. 
 4. BOSTROM, supra note 1, at 1–4. I do not mean to overstate Bostrom’s careful claim: 
It is not that historic gross world product data dictates that we will experience an intelligence 
explosion causing another rate-change in exponential growth, but rather that if we do, it will 
fit historic trends as opposed to breaking the mold. See id. 
 5. For a brief primer on artificial general intelligence, see Kiel Brennan-Marquez & 
Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143–45 (2019). 
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from the earth,” he spoke to enduring values of liberty and 
democracy. Today, these values appear to face an emerging 
threat from technology. Specifically, advances in machine-
learning technology—or artificial intelligence—portend a future 
in which many governmental decisions will no longer be made 
by people, but by computer-processed algorithms.6 
Call me a skeptic, but I don’t think the potential for robot government is 
akin to what was troubling Lincoln as he prepared his remarks for 
Gettysburg, and it requires much more subtle argument—to which 
Coglianese and Lehr of course move—in order to determine whether 
automated government might meaningfully threaten democracy.7 
Milan Markovic has recently argued that “important policy 
considerations . . . counsel against replacing lawyers with intelligent 
machines.”8 First off, claims Markovic, “most human beings prefer to 
interact and conduct business with other humans.”9 I’m again skeptical. 
This alleged preference has not stemmed—nor even slowed—the tide of 
electronic commerce, nor do I see why it would differently apply to other 
sectors where the technology is not yet available. Plenty of humans seem to 
prefer even quite dumb machines as they move to electronic banking and 
other conveniences, and I count myself among them.10 And if I never had to 
visit another human doctor or dentist, what I wouldn’t pay! 
More particularly for Markovic, 
One consideration is largely practical. Intelligent machines pose 
a challenge to the dominant liability regime. If lawyers fail to 
deliver competent legal services to their clients, they are subject 
to . . . malpractice suits. . . . When lawyer robots err, who should 
be held responsible and compensate injured clients?11 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2019). 
 7. See generally id.; see also Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5, at 149–56 
(arguing that democracy demands certain judgments be “role-reversible,” permitting robots a 
role only if they interchangeably sit on both sides of such judgments). See generally Melissa 
Mortazavi, Rulemaking Ex Machina, 117 COLUMBIA L. REV. ONLINE 202 (2017) (cautioning 
against over-reliance on currently available automation in administrative rulemaking).  
 8. Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 343 (2018). 
 9. Id. at 327. 
 10. See, e.g., Survey: Online, Mobile Are Most Popular Banking Channels, AM. 
BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.aba.com/Press/Pages/092117Consumer 
SurveyBankingPreferences.aspx. 
 11. Markovic, supra note 8, at 343 (footnotes omitted). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/2
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So, a lawyer’s argument against robot lawyers is not knowing whom to sue 
when the robot lawyer proves incompetent. All lawyer jokes and American 
hyper-interest in litigation aside, this hardly seems unique to the practice of 
law. Similar liability questions arise with autonomous vehicles, yet few 
expect—and even fewer think it ought—to keep them off the roads. To be 
sure, there are fascinating questions of civil liability to be addressed,12 but 
fascinating questions are little reason for preferring death and carnage, 
whether it take place on the roads or—more metaphorically—via terrible 
representation in our courtrooms. Further, in my particular area of 
interest—the criminal law—malpractice liability hardly takes this center 
stage. Instead, very few such claims are brought, let alone succeed, because 
anyone seeking to recover for malpractice must typically prove not only 
that she would have otherwise won her criminal case, but further that she is 
innocent of the charges.13 
Another of Markovic’s reasons for disfavoring robot lawyers is that 
clients “often do not have clear objectives and require assistance in shaping 
them.”14 Markovic has no argument, however, explaining why AGI lawyers 
could not fulfill this function. Nor does he have arguments supporting his 
claims that AGI lawyers could not push back against unethical clients,15 
would lack emotional intelligence and moral authority,16 would be unable to 
                                                                                                                 
12. See generally Roger Michalski, How to Sue a Robot, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 1021 
(arguing for a sui generis robot liability regime, but one that benefits from much that has 
come before); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, You Might Be a Robot, CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (stressing how difficult it is to delimit what constitutes a robot); Bryan Casey, 
Robot Ipsa Locquitur, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming) (arguing traditional negligence is suited to the 
task); Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(arguing ‘not so fast’); Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability for 
Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing for some 
“supplementary rules”). Again, there are indeed fascinating questions to be answered!  
 13. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: MORE 
TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 89–90 (2017) (explaining these 
and other limitations); J. Vincent Aprile II, Exonerating Criminal Defense Attorneys from 
Civil Malpractice, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2019, 42–44 (expanding upon the same). 
 14. Markovic, supra note 8, at 344. 
 15. See id. at 346. “One especially vital responsibility of attorneys is to push back 
against clients’ unlawful and misguided ends. In this regard, the lawyer is a gatekeeper who 
functions as a ‘buffer between the illegitimate desires of his client and the social interest.’” 
Id. (citation omitted). Again, call me skeptical. 
 16. See id. at 346. This is not to deny that others have made important claims in this 
regard. In addition to that cited by Markovic, see the sources cited infra notes 43, 45.  
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explain themselves,17 or would “flood real (or virtual) courts with 
unsustainable claims, with harried [human?] judges left to separate the 
wheat from the chaf[f].”18 
In short, Markovic’s claims seem to sound in speciesism, preferring 
human decision-making because it is human, not because it is in any 
meaningful way superior.19 Most relevant to my inquiry, he makes the 
following claim about criminal prosecution: “[P]rosecutors do not merely 
seek convictions on behalf of the state; they are required to ensure that the 
accused is ‘accorded procedural justice’” (quoting the ABA Model 
Rules).20 Yes, they are so ethically obliged. Do they consistently fulfill that 
obligation? Hardly.21 Thus, we cannot merely presume that AGI 
prosecutors would do worse.22 
All of which raises the question: Is there reason to think AGI lawyers 
could never serve as prosecutors or defense counsel? What follows is a 
preliminary interrogation. First, Part I comments upon the search for AGI 
and upon methodology: because we lack all relevant details of the 
technology, we cannot focus upon the robot lawyer, nor imagine for her 
limitations that she might not have. Instead, we must begin with the current 
human substantiation, attempting to define its role. Part II thus looks to the 
American prosecutor and criminal defense lawyer, and Part III asks whether 
there is anything about either one for which human decision-making is 
intrinsically important. My initial conclusion is that there seems to be no 
such need for criminal defense, but that there might be for prosecution, 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Markovic, supra note 8, at 347. Markovic does not address questions of 
explainable AI, see, e.g., Brent Mittelstadt et al., Explaining Explanations in AI, in FAT* 
’19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 
279 (ACM Publ’ns 2019), https://doi.org/10.1145/3287560.3287574, let alone take time to 
differentiate the many ways we might achieve artificial general intelligence, each of which is 
critically—and uniquely—different from the machine learning of today, see, e.g., BOSTROM, 
supra note 1, at 26-62. 
 18. Markovic, supra note 8, at 347. 
19. To be clear, Markovic’s claims surely hold for the technologies of today. My dispute 
is with the claim that they would similarly apply to those of AGI.    
 20. Id. at 345 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8. cmt. 1 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2018)). 
 21. See, e.g., Jonathan Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American 
Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASH. L. J. 513, 529–38 
(2012). 
 22. In interrogating the potential for judicial robots and other law-related automation, 
Eugene Volokh proposes a “Modified John Henry Test” “in which a computer program is 
arrayed against, say, ten average performers in some field.” Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice 
Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1138 (2019). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/2
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even if—as is ever the case—instrumental gain should be weighed against 
any such intrinsic value. 
I. Begin with the Humans 
The search for artificial general intelligence is decades-old and is as 
complicated and contested as it is fascinating.23 But, very briefly, what is it 
and when might we have it? Physicist and AI-enthusiast Max Tegmark 
helps with both questions. 
Tegmark divides life on earth into three stages.24 In the first, Life 1.0, life 
evolved to better survive and replicate, and such organisms of course 
continue to slowly evolve over many generations.25 They are in a sense 
amazing, but they are also rather ‘dumb’: the bacterium knows just as much 
on the day it is born as on the day it will die.26 Thus, in the second stage, 
Life 2.0, creatures—foremost among them we humans—brought something 
new: the capacity to learn, or, as Tegmark puts it, to “design [our] 
software.”27 The brain of a human baby is dangerously low on what we 
would consider commonplace knowledge, but, thankfully, stock full of 
potential to learn.28 So far so good. What can’t we do? Design our own 
hardware. Despite some improvements—a new knee here or a new heart 
valve there—we remain essentially tethered to a biologically-marvelous-
yet-limited body that will die on us in a relatively short time, and that can 
only be moderately improved by exercise, training, and known methods of 
surgery. Thus, Life 3.0, “which doesn’t yet exist on Earth, [will] 
dramatically redesign not only its software, but its hardware as well.”29 And 
this is, in a nutshell, the goal of—or, more properly said, a prominent goal 
of—AI: to develop a human-level and human-breadth intelligence (AGI) 
                                                                                                                 
 23. For a description of AGI including citations to its key works, see Brennan-Marquez 
& Henderson, supra note 5, at 143–45. 
 24. MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
24–30 (2017). 
 25. Id. at 25–26. 
 26. Life 1.0 is “life where both the hardware and software are evolved rather than 
designed.” Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
 27. Id. at 26 fig. 1.1. Life 2.0 is “life whose hardware is evolved, but whose software is 
largely designed.” Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
 28. That “the synaptic connections that link the neurons in [our brains] can store about a 
hundred thousand times more information than the DNA that [we are] born with,” allows not 
only different and more nimble intelligence, but greater intelligence. Id. at 28. 
 29. Id. at 26 fig. 1.1. 
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that will not be hampered by the ‘hardware’ limitations of slow biological 
evolution.30 
When will this happen? On a Life 1.0 to 3.0 timescale, in the blink of an 
eye.31 But few of us tend to think on cosmic timescales, so how long might 
it take in more common measurements? There is robust disagreement, 
ranging from the “techno-skeptics” who think we will not reach AGI for a 
century, if ever, to the optimistic few who think it might happen very 
soon.32 Many believe we are looking at somewhere between a few decades 
to a century.33 So, it is not too early to begin to consider AGI’s criminal 
justice role.34 
How might this revolution come about? We really have no idea. Or, 
perhaps better said, we have too many ideas. It might be through a ‘child 
machine’ imagined by Alan Turing that ‘grows up’ through some form of 
directed or nudged—and hopefully much speedier—evolution.35 It might be 
via “whole brain emulation” or “uploading,” in which scientists replicate 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See id. at 30, 39 tbl. 1.1. “The holy grail of AI research is to build ‘general AI’ 
(better known as artificial general intelligence, AGI) that is maximally broad: able to 
accomplish virtually any goal, including learning.” Id. at 52. Nick Bostrom describes AGI 
like this: “Machines matching humans in general intelligence—that is, possessing common 
sense and an effective ability to learn, reason, and plan to meet complex information-
processing challenges across a wide range of natural and abstract domains . . . .” BOSTROM, 
supra note 1, at 4. 
 31. TEGMARK, supra note 24, at 29–30. Tegmark explains: 
After 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution, development has accelerated 
dramatically here on Earth: Life 1.0 arrived about 4 billion years ago, Life 2.0 
(we humans) arrived about a hundred millennia ago, and many AI researchers 
think that Life 3.0 may arrive during the coming century, perhaps even during 
our lifetime . . . . 
Id.(emphasis added). 
 32. See id. at 30–33, 40–42. 
 33. See id. at 30–33, 40–42; BOSTROM, supra note 1, at 22–25. Two early waypoints of 
particular relevance to lawyers have been machine learning systems outperforming attorneys 
in certain tasks (especially in document review) and correctly predicting judicial outcomes. 
See Erin Winick, Lawyer-Bots Are Shaking Up Jobs, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609556/lawyer-bots-are-shaking-up-jobs/ (document 
review); Nikolas Aletras et al., Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective, PEERJ COMPUTER SCI. 2:e93 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://peerj.com/articles/cs-93/. 
 34. As Kiel Brennan-Marquez and I have previously noted, any objection that such 
planning is futile—i.e., AGI will very quickly lead to overwhelming superintelligence that 
will override any such plans—would prove too much. See Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, 
supra note 5, at 145.  
 35. See BOSTROM, supra note 1, at 27–35. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/2
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the computational structure of our own gray matter.36 It might be by 
improving the human brain,37 by interfacing with the human brain,38 or by 
some linkage between multiple human brains.39 Or it might be something 
entirely different. And not knowing the mechanism by which AGI will be 
achieved, we cannot know the form or manner that intelligence will take. 
Perhaps it will merely be improvement upon our own manners of thinking, 
or perhaps it will be something very different. We are fundamentally 
hampered in imagining AGI because we know of only a single form of high 
intelligence—our own—and because we know eerily little about even it. 
We therefore cannot begin with the (unknowable) robot. While we might 
ponder whether robots should be subjected to our criminal law,40 we now 
see this is an impossible question to answer. While long-evolved doctrines 
of actus reus and mens rea might work for the human brain—or might not if 
neuroscience really throws us a curve!41—they might be fundamentally 
unworkable for an entirely different manner of intelligence. We first need to 
know the form or forms of that intelligence, and then we can meaningfully 
ponder its criminal law. Thus, we ought to start not with the intelligent 
machines, but rather with us. Is there something intrinsically important 
about human decision-making, perhaps in certain spheres? Kiel Brenan-
Marquez and I have previously argued that there is: criminal judgments in 
an appropriately democratic society should be “role-reversible,” in that 
those making the judgment ought to be susceptible, reciprocally, to the 
impact of decisions.42 We should only have robo-jurors, then, if we likewise 
interchangeably have robo-defendants. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See id. at 35–43. 
 37. See id. at 43–54. 
 38. See id. at 54–58. 
 39. See id. at 58–60. 
 40. See, e.g., Ying Hu, Robot Criminals, 52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 487 (2019) (arguing 
we should sometimes criminally punish AI); Ryan Abbott & Alex Sarch, Punishing 
Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science Fiction, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(arguing that such criminal punishment would be morally defensible but not an ideal 
solution). 
 41. What might be most important about a human system of criminal justice is that 
humans perceive it to be basically legitimate. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, What Do Criminals 
Deserve? in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. 
MOORE 3 (Kimberly K. Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016) (“Here, then, is the 
legitimate place of crime-reduction in a theory of justified punishment: it provides the most 
important rationale for creating institutions that treat persons as they deserve.”). 
 42. See generally Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5. 
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It is worth pausing to emphasize that when I speak of AGI—and when 
Kiel and I speak of role-reversible AGI—we really mean AGI: a computer 
intelligence at least as smart as a human across the entire topology of 
human intelligence. If, say, Joshua Davis is correct that intelligent machines 
are not likely to achieve the subjective/conscious experience,43 then they are 
not yet as intelligent as humans when it comes to philosophy, and they quite 
obviously could not engage in generic reasoning triggered by a ‘but for the 
grace of god there go I’ influence.44 If human consciousness turns out to be 
a self-delusional fiction, it is ample that machines can engage in the same 
fiction. But if human consciousness is more, then machines need that too. 
Since I tend to be a philosophical materialist, I am cautiously optimistic that 
machines will attain this ability—whatever it is in humans. And since that is 
what I mean by AGI, my analysis proceeds on that assumption.45 
So, what about AGI robo-defense counsel and robo-prosecutors? First, 
we must consider their current, human role. 
II. The Defense and Prosecution Roles 
What is the role of an American criminal defense lawyer? Of a 
prosecutor? These definitional questions are complex and have not been 
wholly resolved by centuries of debate among ethicists.46 They certainly 
will not be resolved here. But since we require some answer in order to ask 
whether there is anything intrinsically important about a human in each 
role, we must at the very least enumerate some popular conceptions and 
attempt to distill their essence. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 43. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Artificial Wisdom? A Potential Limit on AI in Law 
(and Elsewhere), 72 OKLA. L. REV. 51 (2019). Davis does a tremendous job of weaving 
together much of the key philosophical literature in the area, from Descartes to Searle to 
Parfit. 
 44. See Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5, at 149–52. 
 45. Similarly, it would of course alter my analysis if “legal reasoning necessarily 
involves the types of normative judgments that are impossible for AI.” W. Bradley Wendel, 
The Promise and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law, 72 OKLA. L. 
REV. 21, 26 (2019). Although I am much more skeptical of claims to attorney 
‘exceptionalism’—and to human ‘exceptionalism’—than Wendel, his paper, too, is 
necessary reading. My object here is to ask whether we ought to retain human prosecutors or 
defense counsel even if machines are capable of such reasoning. 
 46. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the Central Moral 
Tradition of Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 492–94 (2008) (articulating “three 
camps” of the “professional responsibility world”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss1/2
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A. Criminal Defense 
To many, the best single definition of criminal defense remains the 
famous words of Henry Lord Brougham. In 1820, Brougham threatened to 
cast England into chaos—perhaps civil war—if necessary to defend his 
client, Queen Caroline of Brunswick, in what amounted to divorce (and 
therefore adultery) proceedings:47 
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, 
knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the 
world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER. To save that 
client by all expedient means—to protect that client at all 
hazards and costs to all others, and among others to himself—is 
the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not 
regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction, 
which he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the 
duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them, if 
need be, to the wind, he must go on reckless of the 
consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his 
country in confusion for his client’s protection!48 
Thanks in no small part to Lord Brougham’s genuine threat, the charges 
against the Queen were dropped.49 
This is the elegance of criminal defense: when the State comes in all its 
might against a single person, it is easy to appreciate being a friend to the 
friendless. A comforter to the comfortless. An advocate for the oppressed. 
In the words of the Supreme Court, “a defense lawyer”—including one 
appointed by the State—“best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of 
the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing the undivided interest 
of his client.”50 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1319, 1320–21 (2006); Terry Jenkins, The Queen Caroline Affair, 1820, HISTORY OF 
PARLIAMENT, https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/periods/hanoverians/queen-caroline-
affair-1820 (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 48. HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, 
WRITTEN BY HIMSELF, VOL. II, at 311 n.* (1871) (as quoted by Freedman, supra note 47, at 
1322); see also GIDEON’S PROMISE SUMMER INSTITUTE TRAINING MANUAL 8–9 (n.d.) (on file 
with author) (making the same claim). 
 49. See Freedman, supra note 47, at 1321. 
 50. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Thus, concluded Justice White, a defense lawyer will attempt to “destroy” a 
prosecution witness regardless of whether she thinks that witness truthful. United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
12 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
 
 
Within the bounds of the law, then,51 a criminal defense lawyer owes a 
firm and unyielding duty of loyalty to her client, along with duties of 
investigation, confidentiality, communication and consultation, learning, 
consideration, and zealous advocacy.52 In key decisions at least, the 
defendant is the principal, and the defense attorney the agent.53 The 
responsibilities of criminal defense counsel are, in short, considerable, but 
are also reasonably well articulable. Competently working to the boundaries 
of the law for only one person’s welfare is an understandable, albeit 
daunting, proposition. 
B. Prosecution 
The definitional quandary becomes much more pronounced with the 
American criminal prosecution, because we give the prosecutor enormous 
discretion and only the most nebulous criterion: to do justice.54 For Robert 
                                                                                                                 
 51. As Professor Freedman has stressed, nobody—or at least nobody who has thought it 
through—denies this limitation. See Freedman, supra note 47, at 1323–24; see also Marvin 
E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975) 
(“The business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without violating the 
law.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2(c) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 4th ed. 2015) (“Defense counsel should know and abide by the standards of 
professional conduct as expressed in applicable law and ethical codes and opinions in the 
applicable jurisdiction.”); id. § 4-1.2(d) (“Defense counsel should act zealously within the 
bounds of the law and standards on behalf of their clients, but have no duty to, and may not, 
execute any directive of the client which violates the law or such standards.”). 
 52. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-1.3, 4-3.9, 4-4.1, 4-5.1. In the words of two 
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court, “Defense counsel’s [consultation] obligation is to 
explain the evidence against the defendant, the nature of all defenses that might be provable, 
all the various options the defendant has in pleading guilty or not guilty and going to trial, 
and the possible or likely consequences of those options.” State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 
362 (Utah 1994). 
 53. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (“The Sixth Amendment, in 
granting to the accused personally the right to make his defense, speaks of the ‘assistance’ of 
counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.”) (citations omitted). Several 
key decisions must be made by the defendant herself. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR 
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2. 
 54. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“An inscription on the walls of the 
Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: ‘The United 
States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.’”); Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially 
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); Hurd v. People, 25 
Mich. 405, 416 (1872), superseded on other grounds by People v. Koonce, 648 N.W.2d 153 
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H. Jackson—United States Solicitor General and then Attorney General, 
Supreme Court Justice and then Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg—“The 
qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as 
those which mark a gentleman.”55 The concept of ‘gentleman’ is as 
amorphous as it is gendered anachronism, yet most would agree with 
Jackson that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and 
reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is 
tremendous.”56 Entirely unlike the defense attorney, who merely responds 
to the prosecution—even if in a proactive sense—Jackson recognized that 
the prosecutor 
must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate 
all of the cases in which he receives complaints. . . . We know 
that no local police force can strictly enforce the traffic laws, or 
it would arrest half the driving population on any given morning. 
What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select 
                                                                                                                 
(Mich. 2002) (“The prosecuting officer[’s] . . . object[,] like that of the court, should be 
simply justice . . . .”); ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate.”); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (“The 
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to 
seek justice . . . .”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 4th ed. 2015) (“The prosecutor is an administrator of justice . . .” 
who “should exercise sound discretion . . . .”); id. § 3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the 
prosecutor is to seek justice . . . .”); id. § 3-1.2(f) (“The prosecutor is not merely a case-
processor but also a problem-solver responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal 
justice system.”); id. § 3-4.3(a) (“A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only 
if . . . the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.”). See generally Bruce A. Green, 
Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999). A simple 
Westlaw search indicates that hundreds of courts have stated a prosecutorial duty to “seek 
justice,” which is—according to the National District Attorneys Association—a prosecutor’s 
“Primary Responsibility.” NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (NAT’L DISTRICT 
ATTORNEYS ASS’N 3d ed. 2009), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-
w-Revised-Commentary.pdf. One commentator (favorably) compares this broad, uncertain 
directive to the Jewish one to, “in all [of] your ways acknowledge [God].” Samuel J. Levine, 
Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical 
Obligation to ‘Seek Justice’ in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUSTON L. REV. 
1337, 1340 (2004). 
 55. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 18, 20 (1940) 
(address at Conference of United States Attorneys, Washington D.C., April 1, 1940). 
 56. Id. at 18; see also GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 94 (5th 
ed. 1884) (“The office of the Attorney-General is a public trust, which involves in the 
discharge of it, the exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who stands as 
impartial as a judge.”). 
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the cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense 
is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof 
the most certain. . . . With the law books filled with a great 
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding 
at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost 
anyone.57 
When we consider that Jackson was speaking in 1940, and that Congress 
creates some five hundred crimes each decade, the scope of prosecutorial 
discretion really begins to take shape.58 There of course remains slight 
limitation on the discretion to prosecute—a prosecutor must believe she has 
probable cause59 and cannot decide based upon personal animus, protected 
classification, or exercise of constitutional right60—but review for such 
discrimination is extremely deferential, and there is essentially no effective 
limitation nor review of the decision not to prosecute (a declination).61 So, 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Jackson, supra note 55, at 19. 
 58. See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.) June 16, 2008, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf. In the words of Erik Luna, “[I]t is 
not altogether hyperbolic to say that everyone is a criminal (or at least a potential scofflaw).” 
Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 794 
(2012). 
 59. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“So long as the prosecutor 
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 
generally rests entirely in his discretion.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(a) (“A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only 
if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable 
cause . . . .”). As an aspirational matter, the ABA believes a prosecutor should move forward 
only with admissible evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a 
personal belief in that guilt. See id. §§ 3-1.1(c), 3-4.3(a), 3-4.3(d). 
 60. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“[T]he decision to prosecute 
may not be ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification,’ including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional 
rights.”) (citations omitted); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
§ 3-1.6 (“The prosecutor should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or 
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or socioeconomic status. A prosecutor should not use other improper 
considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 61. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (“[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to 
judicial review.”); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
§ 3-1.2(b) (“The prosecutor serves the public interest . . . both by pursuing appropriate 
criminal charges . . . and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges . . . .”); id. § 
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for Jackson, it is a prosecutor’s responsibility to “protect the spirit as well 
as the letter of our civil liberties. . . . [T]he citizen’s safety lies in the 
prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not 
victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who 
approaches his task with humility.”62 
While the prosecutor must therefore be every bit as competent as the 
defense attorney, we replace a singular zeal with a much more nebulous 
moral humility.63 She must decide who to prosecute, and consequently who 
among the believed-guilty to instead ignore. She must decide who to offer 
pretrial diversion, who instead to offer an otherwise generous deal, and who 
instead will go to public trial and on what charges and evidence. Enormous 
discretion. And the grounds for its exercise are as broad as ‘justice’ itself.64 
III. Robot Prosecution and Defense? 
American criminal defense—especially for indigent persons, but hardly 
better for the genuinely middle-class—is seriously flawed.65 Even if a given 
                                                                                                                 
3-4.4(a) (“[T]he prosecutor is not obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the 
evidence might support.”). Cf. Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation 
of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and 
Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016) (arguing that professional discipline 
could do more to regulate prosecutorial discretion). 
 62. Jackson, supra note 55, at 19-20. 
 63. A prosecutor might additionally have statutory obligations to victims, such as those 
enacted in so-called ‘Marsy’s laws.’ See MARSY’S LAW, https://marsyslaw.us/ (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2018); see also Jeanna Hruska, ‘Victims’ Rights’ Proposals like Marsy’s Law 
Undermine Due Process, ACLU (May 3, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/criminal-law-reform/victims-rights-proposals-marsys-law-undermine-due-process. 
 64. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a) 
(indicating sixteen permissible, non-exclusive grounds a prosecutor could consider); id. § 3-
4.4(b) (indicating a few impermissible grounds); see also David Alan Sklansky, The Nature 
and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 477 (2017) 
(“We want [prosecutors] to be zealous advocates and impartial reviewers of the facts, crime 
fighters and instruments of mercy, law enforcement leaders and officers of the court, loyal 
public servants and independent professionals, champions of community values and 
defenders of the rule of law.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. 
L. REV. (forthcoming) (critiquing this ‘do justice’ model and offering a characteristically 
thoughtful alternative, albeit one still open to many an interpretation). 
 65. In the words of Richard Posner, 
An extensive literature criticizes as inadequate the current level at which the 
defense of indigent criminal defendants in the United States is funded, noting 
the low quality of much of this representation. I can confirm from my own 
experience as a judge that indigent defendants are generally rather poorly 
represented. 
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defense lawyer is capable of great work (or at least of ‘passing’ work), she 
is too often so overwhelmed by an unreasonable workload and/or by 
impossible situations as to be functionally barely competent, or even 
incompetent.66 Yet for reasons promoting the finality of judgments,67 and 
because it is so difficult to ever know counterfactuals,68 we correct only a 
fraction of the errors that occur. Even worse, many criminal defendants face 
what are, practically, critical stages of their prosecution—and life—without 
any attorney to represent them, because the Supreme Court has never held 
bail hearings are themselves a Sixth Amendment critical stage to which the 
right of appointed counsel applies.69 (They are, says the Court, a trigger of 
                                                                                                                 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 163–64 (1999) 
(internal footnotes omitted). Posner provocatively continues, 
But if we are to be hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be entirely 
a bad thing. The lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants seem to be 
good enough to reduce the probability of convicting an innocent person to a 
very low level. If they were much better, either many guilty people would be 
acquitted or society would have to devote much greater resources to the 
prosecution of criminal cases. A bare-bones system for the defense of indigent 
criminal defendants may be optimal. 
Id. at 164. Yikes! Posner concedes, however, that “[t]hese are difficult issues” and that he 
“may . . . be unduly complacent about the unlikelihood of an innocent person’s being 
convicted.” Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Rapping, supra note 21, at 515–18 (describing the impossible dilemma of 
adequately representing criminal defendants in their first appearance); id. at 540–43 
(describing overwhelming caseloads); see also BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 13, at 4–7, 17–
30 (describing, among other substantial problems, overworked, under-skilled, and 
systemically underfunded defense attorneys); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One 
Lawyer, One Day, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-loads.html (chronicling, 
beautifully, the situation for one public defender). 
 67. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693–94 (1984) (articulating a 
deficiency standard that “reflects the profound importance of finality in criminal 
proceedings”); see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (noting that “the 
strong societal interest in finality has ‘special force with respect to convictions based on 
guilty pleas’” (quoting United States v. Timreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)). 
 68. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170–72 (2012) (permitting, where ineffective 
assistance of counsel caused a defendant to go to trial, remedies including “the term of 
imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence . . . received at trial, or 
something in between”). Dissenting, Justice Scalia decried a remedy of “whatever the state 
trial court in its discretion prescribes, down to and including no remedy at all.” Id. at 176 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Such a bizarre remedy makes sense—if it can ever make sense—only 
because it is impossible to know what would have been. 
 69. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). 
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that right going forward.)70 Add to this mix (1) the transaction costs of 
trying to find competent counsel if one has some money to pay (look to the 
‘yellow pages’?!), and (2) that a ‘mere’ arrest can ruin a life (let alone a 
subsequent prosecution, even one leading to acquittal), and things are not at 
all good. 
In short, our criminal justice system is heavy on the ‘criminal’ and light 
on the ‘justice,’ and it is hard not to get at least a bit excited about the 
potential of an army of AGI criminal defense lawyers who could bring 
human-level—or even superhuman—competence to every minute (and 
even every microsecond) of every representation. And because, as 
developed above, a criminal defense lawyer represents solely the interests 
of her client, there seems no reason in democratic theory to demand a 
human being in this role.71 Indeed, to the extent that at least some humans 
in criminal defense suffer an agony of decision—how can I defend her?—
an AGI robot might do better. (Or, if that agony ‘comes with the territory’ 
of intelligence, the AGI robot might do the same.) 
Of course, human prejudice might forestall such gains. An ultimately 
human judge—whether a singular judge considering a guilty plea, a 
singular judge in a bench trial, or a collective jury—might be prejudiced 
against such robots, and therefore against defendants represented by such 
robots. In that case, we might give defendants the informed choice of 
whether to proceed by defense robot; but until the prejudice could be 
overcome, it might be reason enough to retain human defense lawyers, 
albeit lawyers benefited mightily by robot assistance. Hopefully, any such 
prejudice would be short-lived. 
When it comes to robot prosecution, the picture clouds considerably. 
Although we talk about it less, prosecutors also can of course be 
overworked,72 and my sense is that their competence (globally speaking) 
tends to be far too low given their unique, powerful role. This is where AGI 
prosecutors could help. But unlike for criminal defense, it is in the very 
nature of the prosecutorial role not merely to discern—what are the facts 
and the law?—and to advocate—how should we feel about them?—but to 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. Cf. Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5, at 156–63 (arriving at a different 
conclusion for the criminal jury). 
 72. See generally Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Overloaded Prosecutors, 33 
CRIM. JUST. 31 (2018); Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: 
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
261, 266–74 (2011). 
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judge.73 In our world of draconian over-criminalization in both scope and 
severity, we expect the prosecutor to decline many winnable prosecutions, 
and if she did not, we would not only further swamp our already inadequate 
adjudicatory systems, but we would needlessly destroy even more lives.74 A 
prosecutor, then, may not be the executioner, but she is the preliminary 
judge and jury. Assuming Kiel Brennan-Marquez and I are right that 
democratic theory requires role-reversible judgments,75 it is not 
immediately apparent that these initial, prosecutorial judgments should be 
exempt from that requirement. True, prosecutorial judgments are always 
followed by later role-reversible ones—a judge or jury—but it seems the 
protection ought to be against the very prosecution, not merely against an 
unfavorable outcome therein.76 
Therefore, so long as prosecutors are making declination decisions—and 
essentially unreviewable declination decisions at that—there is intrinsic 
reason to keep a human in the role. But this is not to say, of course, that the 
intrinsic benefits of a human prosecutor necessarily outweigh the 
instrumental benefits of a machine one. It might mean, however, that the 
ideal is a combination of the two, meaning every charging decision must be 
considered by both a human prosecutor and a machine. If so, should any 
prosecution require a ‘yes’ from both (a logical and)? This would preserve 
the human ability to decline and permit the machine to function as an early 
check against misguided prosecutions, but it would also potentially—
depending upon programming or particular machine intelligence—give a 
machine the ability to decline, a check against undesirable prosecutions. 
In the alternative, should any prosecution require only a human ‘yes’ (a 
form of logical or)? If so, should the human prosecutor have to make a 
written, publicly-available justification for proceeding where the machine 
                                                                                                                 
 73. For some excellent insight into this prosecutorial judgment, see generally Máximo 
Langer & David Alan Sklansky, Epilogue: Prosecutors and Democracy—Themes and 
Counterthemes in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Máximo 
Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017); Sklansky, supra note 64; David Alan Sklansky, 
The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2017). 
 74. See generally Luna, supra note 58. 
 75. See generally Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5. 
 76. This might be analogized to the constitutional tort doctrine of qualified immunity. 
While I, like many, think the Supreme Court has qualified immunity dramatically wrong as a 
substantive standard—shielding all but the “plainly incompetent”—it is sensible to protect 
some persons not only from ultimate liability but further from the very trial determination 
thereof. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (explaining the 
Court’s qualified immunity standard). Indeed, at least some such preference seems right 
‘across the board’ for criminal prosecutions. 
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counsels against? Should that justification be made available to the ultimate 
decision-maker (judge or jury)? And what about the opposite situation, in 
which the machine recommends prosecution, but the human declines? 
Should this, too, require a written, publicly-available justification, in order 
that we can better understand—and hopefully make more fair—the 
declination decision? 
All of these considerations are worthy of significant thought, which I 
will leave to future work. For now, the key insight is this: while there does 
not seem to be inherent reason to prefer human defense counsel, there does 
seem inherent reason to retain human prosecutors, albeit reason that might 
be overwhelmed by instrumental machine benefits. Additionally, the lens of 
potentially impending AGI might shine new light on a very old problem: 
we ought to consider whether it would be possible to more precisely define 
the prosecutorial role, what would be the implications thereof, and whether 
we can at the very least make it more transparent and accountable. 
Conclusion 
When we put aside speciesism and appreciate the massive injustices in 
our systems of criminal justice, we can’t help being excited about the 
positive changes artificial general intelligence might permit. Yes, some 
attorneys—maybe even many or most attorneys—might have to find 
different jobs, realistically meaning that fewer will go into these lines of 
work. This will be disruptive. But just like AGI should bring about a world 
of fewer human bankers, doctors, and dentists, if these changes bring more 
accurate and fair criminal justice, and if they are not otherwise intrinsically 
harmful, they are to be eagerly anticipated. My preliminary claim is that 
such is the case for criminal defense attorneys, and—even more 
preliminarily—that the intrinsic loss in adopting robo-prosecutors might be 
worth the very significant instrumental gains. Assuming progress in 
artificial intelligence continues, then, we ought to think more on these 
topics in order to render more likely the beneficial integration of its results. 
And even before we achieve AGI—or, even if we never achieve AGI—
lesser computer intelligences might significantly aid our inadequate systems 
of criminal justice. We currently know next to nothing about prosecutorial 
declinations, and we expect next to nothing of prosecutors in terms of 
explaining them, apart from the relatively rare cases of significant public 
and political interest. And despite decades of consciousness regarding 
inadequate provision of criminal defense counsel, solutions continue to 
elude us. Yes, experience teaches that it would be foolish to expect too 
much. But it also teaches that it would be morally opaque not to try. 
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